workable competition. Under this aegis, three courts have seized upon market share as a basis The judiciary has relied on a firm's market for evaluating the presence of actual monop-
firms when measuring welfare costs of monopKey words: cooperatives, contestable markets, oly power. Contestable market theory, develantitrust, monopoly oped by Baumol and others, provides a unifying theory of market structure based on freedom of VWorkable, as opposed to perfect competientry and exit. The theory implies that market tion has been employed by economists as a share is at best only a necessary condition for standard for judging real-world market condimonopoly power and, at worst, of little imtions. Markham has proposed that an industry portance in measuring market efficiency. is workably competitive when dynamic forces that determine market structure have been exThe objective of this paper is to discuss the amined and there are no public policy altertheory of contestable markets and evaluate its natives that would influence this market importance in the area of agricultural cooperstructure in such a manner that social welfare atives. Properties of contestable markets are first increases. The criteria for judging such a workexplained and related to market shares. Previous ably competitive market have been formulated research in market structure and judicial interin terms of market structure, conduct, and perpretations of the monopolization restrictions of formance (Sosnick) . the Sherman Antitrust Act are then investigated Market structure generally encompasses the on the basis of contestability theory with emmarket shares of individual firms in an industry phasis upon cooperative monopolization and and firms' freedom to enter and exit the incontestable markets. dustry. Researchers have measured the market shares of various firms in an industry as an CONTESTABLE MARKETS indicator of workable competition with the assumption that the higher a firm's market share, Perfectly contestable markets are defined by the greater its potential monopoly power. For Baumol, Panzar, and Willig as markets accessible example, Scherer states that when the leading to potential entrants, with the following two four firms control 40 percent or more of the properties. First, potential entrants have identotal market, it is a fair assumption that an tical production technologies and face the same oligopolistic market structure exists. Although market demands as incumbent firms. This imScherer does state that market share is at best plies potential entrants face no cost barriers to only a one dimensional indicator of monopoly entry. There must also be freedom of exit. Secpower, this type of generalization may lead to ond, potential entrants employ incumbent firms' the false premise that market share is a sufficient pre-entry prices in their decision regarding encriterion to measure a firm's divergence from try. Potential entrants may recognize that an expansion of industry output results in de-MC(qi) < MC(qj) for all qi and q, with pressed prices. However, they assume that if 0 < qj < qi < q. they undercut incumbents' prices, they can market as much of the commodity as the market These cost concepts are essential in the dedemands at their price.
termination of the structure, conduct, and perContestable market theory is a generalization formance of an industry. With these cost function of the classical theory of perfect competition concepts and the industry demand function with fewer assumptions required to obtain eco-Q(p), the equilibrium market structure of a nomic efficiency. Unlike perfect competition, single product industry can be determined. Any firms in a contestable market may not be small equilibrium industry structure must satisfy the or numerous nor produce a homogeneous prodfollowing two properties: uct. Contestable markets share only one attribute with perfect competition; freedom of entry and exit. Thus, a perfectly competitive market 1. Feasible Industry Configuration: is necessarily a contestable market but a con-A feasible industry configuration is comtestable market is not necessarily perfectly composed of n firms respectively producing petitive. Contestability theory thereby, without the output quantities q, ... , qn for sale modification, becomes applicable to imperfect at price p, competition as well as perfect competition. The theory takes market structure to be determined Y' qi = Q(p) and pqi -C(qi) >-0 endogenously and simultaneously with the level i= for i = 1 . . n.
of industry output and prices. This is in contrast to traditional analysis where the structure of particular markets is exogenous to the analysis Every market structure analysis at least implicof output and price determination.
itly incorporates this feasibility condition. HowPertinent to the contestability theory, deterever, for a feasible industry configuration to be mination of structure, conduct and performance in equilibrium in a contestable market, it must of an industry are three basic cost concepts.
not offer any opportunities for profitable entry, These three cost concepts, in conjunction with even when entry costs are zero. Rather it must truly free entry and exit, provide an endogenous satisfy the following property for a sustainable and simultaneous determination of the size and configuration. number of firms in the industry. A brief discussion of the relationship among these cost concepts, industry sustainability and contesta-2. Sustainable Industry Configuration: bility is provided. For a detailed discussion of Afeasible industry configuration with price these concepts and formal proof of the followp and firm outputs q. . , q is sustainable ing contestability properties, refer to Baumol, if pq c(q) for all p, ' p and qi Panzar, and Willig. The three basic cost con-Q(Pi)' cepts are as follows:
This implies that no potential entrants can ex-1. Strict Subadditivity:
pect to earn positive pure profits, given the A cost function c(q) is strictly subadditive incumbents' prices and outputs. at q if for any and all quantities of outputs Output determination, pricing, and efficiency q, ,, qn; qi q; i = , . .. , n; in a contestable market follow directly from n n these two properties. A sustainable configura-E qi = q, c(q) < E c(qi). tion must minimize the total cost to the industry i= 1 i= 1 of a given level of industry output. No different configuration of size distribution, output levels, A cost function is subadditive at output q or production technologies for firms can proif it is more expensive for two or more vide a given level of industry output at a lower firms to produce q than it is for q to be total cost than that incurred by firms in a susproduced by a single firm. tainable configuration. Intuitively, this result implies that if there existed an alternative in-2. Declining Average Costs:
dustry configuration that could produce the same Average c osts decline through output q Average c osts decline through output q given level of output at a lower cost, at least one of those producers would earn positive pure c(qi)/qi < c(q,)/q, for all qi and qj with profits. There would then exist at least one
profitable entry plan for potential entrants. The present configuration is then vulnerable to entry 3. Declining Marginal Costs:
and thus blocked by an alternative configuration Marginal costs decline through output q until a Nash equilibrium is obtained where total if industry cost is minimized for a given level of output.l Furthermore, this result suggests that the smaller the number of firms in a market, if two or more firms produce positive amounts the greater will be the divergence between price of the same commodity in a sustainable industry and marginal cost. The constant threat of entry configuration, their outputs must be such that ensures that only firms which practice marginal their marginal costs are equal. This result is cost pricing can be present in long run multianalogous to multi-plant firms or the operation firm equilibrium. of cartels where firms attempt to minimize costs. A configuration is not sustainable if total cost could be reduced by a reallocation of output RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS to lower cost firms.
Contestable market theory is of particular The nature of equilibrium pricing and effiimportance in agricultural cooperative research ciency in a contestable industry was determined involving allegations of antitrust violations. Preby Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, and was shown vious research in this area has employed market to have the following two properties:
shares as a measure of market imperfection without considering entry and exit conditions. For 1. In any sustainable industry configuration, example, Parker and Connor in estimating consumer losses due to imperfections in the U.S.
food manufacturing industries base their analysis on market share. Contestable market theory A counter example provides a proof of this indicates that market share may be irrelevant property. If marginal cost was greater than price, in showing the presence of monopoly power a potential entrant could earn a positive pure because of the threat of entry by other firms. profit by employing the same production techThereby, it may be inappropriate to use market nology with a small reduction in quantity. Reshare as a screening criterion to identify whether duction in output decreases total cost more than a cooperative has violated section 2 of Capperthe decrease in total revenue and thus profits Volstead, as suggested byJesse,Johnson, Marion, increase.
and Manchester. The relative size of a cooperative and the market shares of competing firms 2. In a sustainable industry configuration inmay be unimportant and the problems of comvolving two or more producing firms, all puting and interpreting a cooperative's market firms must produce outputs at which p = share may be avoidable.
MC(qi), and pq, = C(q), i = 1,..., n Jesse, Johnson, Marion, and Manchester also > 2. advocate the use of the concept of workable competition in determining if a cooperative has The previous property prevents price from being exercised market power and unduly enhanced less than marginal cost in a sustainable industry price. Performance comparisons can be made configuration. To prove that price cannot be between prices in a suspected monopoly power greater than marginal cost for firms in an inmarket with prices in a workably competitive dustry, suppose that for firm qj, price does exmarket. They suggest that the prices of workably ceed marginal cost. A profitable entry plan now competitive marets are more appropriate as exists since a potential entrant can mimic the norms for evaluating price enhancement than production technology of this incumbent firm those of perfect competition. The problem is and increase output. This leads to potential pure to define an operational criterion for judging a profits for the entrant. The presence of at least workably compettiive market. For appraisal astwo incument firms is required for the proof sumptions of size and number of firms in the since this enables an entrant to market a higher industry under a workably competitive model level of output than qj without a significant may be overly restrictive. Contestable market reduction in market price. theory is not restricted by these assumptions. Finally, if total revenue was less than a total Thus, an appraisal that relies on the contestacost, a firm could not remain solvent in the bilityofmarkets offers a standard against which long run and the configuration would not be actual markets can be compared even though sustainable. If pure profits existed (total reveperfect contestability is not likely to be satisfied nue greater than cost), an entrant could unby any real market. dercut incumbents' prices and still earn pure profits. Thus, in a sustainable industry config-COOPERATIVE MONOPOLIZATION uration, incumbent firms must earn zero pure profits with price equaling both marginal cost Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act deand average cost. This result is inconsistent with dares that it is unlawful for any person to the traditional view dating back to Cournot that monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or product and geographic market, while a minimal showing of product and geographic context In addition, Section 2 of Capper-Volstead ofis required for an alleged conspiracy to mofers a check on cooperative activities that unnopolize. The court did not need to rely on a duly enhance the price of an agricultural product market share evaluation for its decision because through monopolizing or restraining trade in it found that three of the defendant dairy cointerstate or foreign commerce. The Secretary operatives had engaged in predatory conduct of Agriculture is required to initiate a complaint that was clearly not mmunized by Capper-Volagainst such activities. However, no secretary stead. has used this provision.
has used this provision. The cooperative in Dairymen was charged O'Hara notes that arguments concerning anwith attempted monopolization; the cooperatitrust monopolization show a dichotomy betive had explicitly intended to achieve the untween a focus on conduct, the judicially lawful goal of monopoly power. The court stated preferred criterion, and structure and performthe standard test for attempted monopolization ance criteria favored by economists. Cases inas being anticompetitive conduct with a specific terpreting the antitrust laws governing intent to monopolize and a dangerous probacooperatives show courts adopting conduct as bility of success. An intent to monopolize could a determinant of activities that are illegal. Conexist even if there was economic justification duct, such as predatory pricing through poolif the anticompetitive practice was undertaken loading, is not within the legitimate objects in the desire to achieve an unlawful goal. A immunized by the Capper-Volstead Act. Thus, dangerous probability of success of achieving courts have routinely held that predatory conmonopoly power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act could be evaluated by examnonqualifying organizations. There also exist a ining the cooperative's market share within relcomplex set of government marketing regulaevant geographic submarkets. The cause of action tions and excess milk production. These cirwas remanded to the district court to determine cumstances markedly alter the structure of many the relevant geographic submarkets. milk markets. Thus, Dairymen says that market share in Market conditions for fluid milk imply that, relevant geographic submarkets may be used to relative to existing suppliers, a new milk supshow a Sherman violation of an attempt to moplier is not at a disadvantage in terms of pronopolize. Although the circuit court did not duction technique or product quality. A milk directly connect market share with the coopsupplier may also have relative freedom of entry erative's unlawful goal, their relationship is and exit to a given market. Freedom of entry mandated by the proof requirements of an atexists by reason that a hauler or supplier may tempted monopolization violation. There must have excess capacity that could be utilized by be a specific intent of achieving monopoly expanding into a new area. The pooling, marpower. The only proof reported by the court keting, and pricing arrangements available to in Dairymen that is responsive to the element cooperatives also may provide for relatively of monopoly power was evidence of the cocostless entry into a new market. operative's market share in relevant geographic submarkets.
Two These arrangements suggest that a firm with organizations qualifying under the Capper-Volan excess or deficit supply of milk may be able stead exemption market over 60 percent of our to enter or leave certain milk markets without country's dairy products (U.S. Government Acimpediment. Thus, selected markets of the milk counting Office). Capper-Volstead allows these hauling and supply industry may be vulnerable business organizations to enter into nonpredato hit-and-run entry and thus be close to a tory pooling arrangements, supply and conperfectly contestable market. The degree of consignment contracts and price-fixing agreements testability is, of course, an empirical question. that are precluded by the antitrust laws for However, if these conditions had characterized the markets at issue in Dairymen and Alexlistic activities by reason of the Capper-Volstead ander, each cooperative's market share would affirmative defense. This is because the theory have been immaterial. The welfare properties offers a procedure to determine whether a firm of a contestable market mean that there is no has monopoly power, a required condition for monopoly power. Since monopoly power is the an actual and attempted monopolization viocrux of a Sherman monopolization violation, lation. the existence of the properties of a perfectly
Courts have suggested that a large market contestable market precludes a finding of such share may constitute an unlawful goal or may a violation. demonstrate monopoly power. The theory of In Alexander, the high overhead costs of the contestable markets offers evidence to counter existing milk suppliers constituted an ineffithe assumption that a firm's market share is ciency that resulted in the price of their milk sufficient to prove a monopolization violation. being greater than the marginal costs associated A Sherman Act Section 2 actual or attempted with efficient production. This situation allowed monopolization violation requires substantiathe National Farmers Organization to enter the tion of the existence of monopoly power or the market and price its milk at marginal cost, which dangerous probability of success of achieving was lower than the price of existing firms. Rather such power. In a perfectly contestable market, than reducing their overhead costs in order to the market is open to competition so there is make themselves competitive with the National no monopoly power. Farmers Organization, the existing firms adopted An allegation that a cooperative's large market practices including supply shorting and late share constitutes monopoly power may be redeliveries, discriminatory pricing, coercive futed by showing a threat of entry of other firms threats of supply cutoffs, committed supply with evidence establishing the major properties agreements, and threats of litigation. These of contestable markets. The evidence would predatory activities were designed to prevent show a market accessible to potential freedom the National Farmers Organization from supto exist. Such evidence means that the coopplying milk at marginal cost. If permitted, these erative could not use its market position to activities would have resulted in prices greater control prices or stifle competition. Thus, the than marginal cost and would have destroyed cooperative does not possess monopoly power the contestability of the market.
as required for an actual or attempted monopBecause the predatory conduct was illegal olization violation. under the Sherman Act, the Alexander court CASES did not need to consider further the concepts of structure and performance in order to den tion Farmer Organiz termine whether there was monopoly power. 3 (8th Cir. 1982 monopo-192 (6th Cir. 1981 ).
